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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
parties and to the courts to provide a means by which unnecessary
litigation might be avoided. In cases involving contracts, such as Pan-
zeca, litigation might be prevented by a settlement based on an amount
named in the plaintiff's claim; in cases involving torts, filing of a claim
will, at the least, enable the defendant to investigate it while the facts
are still fresh.280
CRIMINAL CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS
Contempt: Judicial and criminal contempt convictions arising out of
single episode not barred under double jeopardy prohibition.
In People v. Colombo231 the New York Court of Appeals has unan-
imously decided that a recent Supreme Court pronouncement does not
alter the traditional view that successive contempt convictions under
the Judiciary and Penal Laws are not within the ambit of the double
jeopardy prohibition.
Granted immunity, defendant Colombo nevertheless refused to
testify before a regular Kings County grand jury investigating the use
of legitimate business enterprises as a cover for alleged criminal activi-
ties. A supreme court justice orderered the defendant to testify. Subse-
quently, he was adjudged in criminal contempt of court pursuant to
section 750(A)(3) of the Judiciary Law232 for his refusal to obey the
supreme court order, and was sentenced to thirty-days imprisonment.
Thereafter, the grand jury indicted defendant for his refusal to
testify in violation of section 600(6) of the former Penal Law.283 His
230See, e.g., Winbash v. City of Mt. Vernon, 306 N.Y. 327, 333, 118 N.E.2d 459, 462
(1954).
23129 N.Y. 2d 1, 271 N.E.2d 694, 323 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1971).
232 A. A court of record has power to punish for a criminal contempt, a person
guilty of any of the following acts, and no others:
3. Willful disobedience to its lawful mandate.
N.Y. JUDIciARY LAw § 750(a)(3) (McKinney 1969).
233 The former section 600(6) provided:
A person who commits a contempt of court, of any one of the following kinds,
is guilty of a misdemeanor:
6. Contumacious and unlawful refusal to be sworn as a witness, or, after being
sworn, to answer any legal and proper interrogatory ...
The present counterparts of the above provision are:
A person is guilty of criminal contempt when he engages in any of the following
conduct:
4. Contumacious and unlawful refusal to be sworn as a witness in any
court proceeding except a refusal to give testimony before a grand jury, or
after being sworn, to answer any legal and proper interrogatory ....
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.50(4) (McKinney Supp. 1970).
A person is guilty of criminal contempt of a grand jury where, after having
been granted immunity, he refuses to be sworn as a witness before a grand jury,
or who, after being sworn as such a witness, refuses to answer any legal and
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motion to dismiss the 'indictment as a-violation of the double jeopardy
limitation was granted by the Supreme Court, Kings County. However,
the dismissal was overturned- by the Appellate Division,21 4 Second De-
partment, and the Court of Appeals, without opinion, affirmed.23 5 _
At the petitioner's request, the United States Supreme Court
granted a writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the
case to the New York Court of Appeals for further consideration in
light of Waller v. Florida,236 decided after the Court of Appeals' affirm-
ance.23 7 In Waller, the petitioner was tried and convicted by a municipal
court for removing a mural from the city hall of St. Petersburg. Upon
completion of a 180-day prison term, petitioner was tried and con-
victed of grand larceny by a Florida state court. The Supreme Court
decide[d] only that Florida courts were in error to the extent ofholding that- "even if. a person ha been tried in a municipal court
for the identical offense with which he is charged in a state court,
this would not be a bar to the prosecution of such person in the
proper state court."238
The New York Court of Appeals, in adhering to its original deci-
sion, found Waller to be inapplicable for three major reasons: (1)
Waller involved successive prosecutions by a municipality and a state;
no such distinction existed in Colombo; (2) Colombo did not involve
two prosecutions, for the proceeding under the Judiciary Law was
essentially civil; (3) Wailer was prosecuted twice for a single act;
Colombo's continued refusal in the face of the court order gave rise to
distinct bases for punishment. Thus, the opinion conforms to the tradi-
tional view that the interests served by imposition of criminal contempt
are distinct from those involving judicial contempt. In the latter case,
the illegal behavior is the attempt to undermine the power of' the
courts. In this sense, the refusal to obey the court is a separate act. This
proper interrogatory. Criminal contempt of a grand jury is a Class E felony.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.51 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
The penalty for contempt under 215.50 is limited to imprisonment for one- year.
Section 215.51 provides for a maximum sentence of four years. The distinction and
corresponding disparity in punishment was prompted by district attorneys who had
encountered difficulty in investigating organized crime because suspected members of
organized crime repeatedly refused to testify before grand juries. 39 MCKiNNEY's N.Y.
PENAL LAw § 215.51, supp. commentary at 150 (1970).
234 32 App. Div. 2d 812, 302 N.Y.S.2d 488 (2d Dep't) (mem.)., aff'd without opinion,
25 N.Y.2d 641, 254 N.E.2d 340, 306 N.YS.2d,258 (1969).
23525 N.Y.2d 641, 254 NXE.2d 340, 306 N.Y.S.2d 258 (1969), vacated and remanded,
400 US. 16 (1970) (per curiam), reinstated, 29 N.Y.2d 1, 271 N.E2d 694, 323 N.Y.S.2d
161 (1971).
236 397 US. 387 (1970).
237 400 US. 16 (1970) (per curiam).
238 397 US. at 395.
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distinction finds statutory support in Penal Law 215:55, wherein pun-
ishment for a criminal contempt adjudicated under 750(A)(3) of the
Judiciary Law is declared not to preclude criminal prosecution for the
same conduct.
While the continued erosion of the simple common-law maxim,
nemo debet bis puniri pro uno delicto,230 may properly be the subject
of criticism, 240 it appears to be sound policy, for purposes of double
jeopardy, to distinguish between the commission of a single crime and
the type of conduct involved in Colombo. The mildness of the judicial
contempt sanction in New York makes the instant decision all the more
palatable.
SURROGATE PRACTICE
Waiver of citation and consent to probate: Pre-probate decree with-
drawal permitted where status quo remained unchanged.
Section 401(4) of the Surrogate's Court Procedure Act241 provides
that in any proceeding within the subject matter jurisdiction of the
Surrogate's Court, the filing of a waiver of issuance and service of pro-
cess shall constitute a notice of appearance. 242 Although this same act
makes no provision for the filing of a consent to probate (an act which
is wholly unnecessary so long as there is a valid waiver Of citation),243
that consent is normally embodied in the original waiver of process.244
239 "No man ought to be punished twice for one offense." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY
1189 (4th ed. 1951).
240 See, e.g., Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 150 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting); Abbate
v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 201 (1958) (Black J., dissenting). See generally Note, Double
Jeopardy: A Vanishing Constitutional Right, 14 How. L. J. 360 (1968); Note, Constitutional
Law - Double Jeopardy, 13 N.Y.L.F. 133 (1967).
241 N.Y. SuPRR. CT. PRoc. AcT § 401(4) (McKinney 1967) [hereinafter SCPA]:
Appearance by waiver of process. Any adult competent party may also appear
by an acknowledged waiver of issuance and service of process .... In a probate
proceeding the waiver shall state the date of the will to which it relates.
242 It is in that reference that the document serves to confer in personam jurisdiction
on the court, as the maker "appears" in the Surrogate's Court and "waives" the issuing
and service of a citation. SCPA § 203 states that "[p]ersonal jurisdiction of parties is
obtained by service of process upon the parties or by submission to the jurisdiction of
the court by waiver of issuance and service of process .... " (Emphasis added). It should
be noted that SCPA § 1403 sets out those persons upon whom process is to be served in a
proceeding for the probate of a will where no waiver has been executed. It is of further
significance that a majority of all probate proceedings are dealt with by waiver of citation,
and that less than one percent of all will contests are ever successful. In re Frutiger,
29 N.Y.2d 143, 155, 272 N.E.2d 543, 549, 324 N.Y.S.2d 36, 45 (1971) (Burke, J., dissenting).
243"For a valid probate the portion relating to consent is unnecessary. When a
citation is issued and no objections are filed, there are no consents by the person so cited."
In re Frutiger 62 Misc. 2d 169, 167, 308 N.Y.S2d 692, 697 (Sur. Ct. Broome County), rev'd,
35 App. Div. 2d 755, 814 N.Y.S.2d 949 (3d Dep't 1970), rev'd 29 N.Y.2d 143, 272 N.E.2d
543, 324 N.Y.S.2d 36 (1971).
244 See, e.g., 25 CARMODY-WAIT 2d § 149:183, at 170-71 (1968).
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